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I. ABSTRACT 
 
This article analyzes the first amendment right of 
condemned prisoners to have their spiritual advisor with 
them up to the point of execution. It dives into a brief yet 
relevant historical background of the death penalty in the 
United States. Then it analyzes the specific protections 
awarded to death penalty inmates up to the point of their 
executions through R.L.U.I.P.A. At its core, it compares 
and contrasts two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) and Murphy v. 
Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1111 (2019), in which the Court reached 
two different conclusions regarding the matter of a 
prisoner's right to a spiritual advisor during execution. 
The comparison is made in the light of the Establishment 
Clause and Free exercise of religion, as established in the 
First Amendment of the Constitution. It concludes that 
denying condemned prisoners a right to have their 
spiritual advisor with them up to the point of execution is 
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a violation of their First Amendment rights, as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 
 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
On April 3, 2015, Anthony Ray Hinton walked out 
of the Alabama Death Row Unit after 30 years in a 5x7 cell. 
His first words, as his family and friends hugged him 
were, "[t]he sun does shine."1 He had been arrested thirty 
years ago and charged with two capital murders. He 
asserted his innocence through his entire time on death 
row. The state prosecutors refused to re-examine the 
evidence in the case, despite persuasive and reliable 
evidence proving Mr. Hinton’s innocence. Mr. Hinton was 
told several times that a ballistic analysis, which would 
take about an hour, and would exonerate him from the 
crime, would be “a loss of time and taxpayer’s money.”2 
Despite the overwhelming evidence brought to the 
Alabama courts by Mr. Hinton’s legal team, it was not 
until the Supreme Court, by a 9-0 decision reversed the 
lower courts and a new trial was granted.3 The Judge then 
finally dismissed the charges against him, after the 
ballistic report confirmed that the crime bullets did not 
match Hinton’s weapon. 
Walter McMillian, a black pulpwood worker, spent 
six years in the Alabama Death Row unit, charged with 
the killing of  Ms. Ronda Morrison, a young, white 
woman. At the time of the murder, Mr. McMillian was at 
a church fry with dozens of witnesses. He was unlawfully 
tried with an all-white jury that convicted him to life in 
prison without parole. Judge Robert E. Lee Key, overrode 
the recommendation of life sentence and imposed the 
 
1 Anthony Ray Hinton, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,  
https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabama-
death-row (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
2 Id.  
3 Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014). 




death penalty. After three years into the appellate process, 
the Court concluded that the State suppressed exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence that had been requested by 
the defense, thus denying the defendant due process of 
law.4 He passed away in 2013, just ten years after his 
release from death row due to trauma-induced dementia.  
“The death penalty is not about whether people 
deserve to die for the crimes they commit. The real 
question of capital punishment in this country is, do we 
deserve to kill?”5 With this striking statement, Bryan 
Stevenson, human rights attorney, law professor, and 
author, shakes the foundations of anyone who would 
listen. He has dedicated his career to fighting racial 
inequality in the United States. He was the appellate 
attorney of Mr. Ray and Mr. McMillian. The worrisome 
similarities in the stories of these two defendants are not 
random. They are both black, poor, uneducated and 
innocent, in a state where racism has evolved from the 
obvious evils of lynching and into the courtrooms. “You 
are treated better if you are rich and guilty than if you are 
poor and innocent.”6  
The death penalty in our country dates back to the 
times where we were not yet a country. European settlers 
brought this practice with them to the Americas, mainly 
from Britain. The first record of an execution in the 
colonies dates back to Jamestown in 1608.7 The death 
penalty is currently legal in 29 states, and it is instituted at 
 
4 McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 
5 Bryan Stevenson, “We need to talk about an injustice,” TED (March 
2012),   
https://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_ab
out_an_injustice/transcript?language=en#t-817040. 
6 Id.  
7 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).  
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both federal and state levels.8 There is broad discretion as 
to how to apply the death penalty.9 From legislators to 
prosecutors, the decision of whether or not to pursue the 
death penalty for a specific case is entirely discretionary.10 
The Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
address the possible constitutionality issues that might 
arise from the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment 
protects against "cruel and unusual punishment."11 The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment states that no citizen of 
the United States shall be "deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law;"12  
 In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutionality of the death penalty.13 The case 
combined three black defendants who had been sentenced 
to the death penalty for separate crimes of murder and 
rape. Two of the three defendants had unusually low I.Q.s 
and education. The issue presented in the case was 
whether the respective death sentences constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In a five to four decision, the 
Court determined that in these cases, the death penalty 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it had 
been arbitrarily applied.14 Justice Douglas’ opinion 
focused on how the death penalty was being 
disproportionately imposed on disadvantaged groups,15 
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Brennan and 
 
8 See Death Penalty Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/us/death-penalty-fast-
facts/index.html. 
9 28 C.F.R. § 26. 
10 Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States that Kill: Discretion and the Death 
Penalty—A Worldwide Perspective,  29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263 (1996).  
11 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.  
12 U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV.  
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
14 Id. at 239-40.  
15 Id. at 250.  




Justice Marshall argued that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional in all cases because it was "excessive and 
unnecessary," and it "did not comport with human 
dignity."16  
The questions raised by this decision are still 
lingering today. Studies have found that the modern death 
penalty still disproportionally affects disadvantaged 
groups, as Justice Douglas remarked. Capital punishment 
means, “they without the capital get the punishment.”17  
Since 1973 more than 160 people have been exonerated 
from death row.18  The so-called 'Bible Belt' region, 
composed of the southern states, accounts for over 80% of 
all executions.19 This is significant, considering the history 
of bigotry and racism that still haunts this part of the 
country. In Louisiana, the odds of a death sentence were 
97% higher for those whose victims were white than for 
those whose victims were black.20 A comprehensive study 
of the death penalty in North Carolina found that the odds 
of receiving the death sentence rose by 3.5 times among 
those defendants whose victims were white.21  In 96% of 
states where there have been reviews of race and the death 
penalty, there was a pattern of either race-of-victim or 
race-of-defendant discrimination, or both.22  
 
16 Id. at 270, 359. 
17 Id.  
18 See R.C. Dieter, Abstract (1997) 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=171560.  
19 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).  
20 Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East 
Baton Rouge Parish, 1990-2008, 71 La. L. Rev. (2011). 
21 Issac Unah, “Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina - An 
Empirical Analysis: 1993-1997,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER (Apr. 16, 2001), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/resources/publications-and-
testimony/studies/race-and-the-death-penalty-in-north-carolina. 
22 “The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, 
Who Decides,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (June 4, 1998), 
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Arguments in favor of the death penalty focus on 
the determent of crime. However, statistics show that the 
south remains the area of the country with the highest 
murder rate.23 On average, the death penalty costs about 
three times what a non-capital case would, including life 
in prison sentences.24 From 2013 to 2017, the United States 
was the only country in the American continents to legally 
carry out executions.25 The United Nations has harshly 
condemned the death penalty and has been leading efforts 
to abolish it since it created the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, where they consider the abolition 
of the death penalty as “a goal for civilized nations.”26  
 
A. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
 
 “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”27 
 The First Amendment is, quite possibly, the most 
protected right within our Constitution. What makes the 
United States a unique country in the world, is our, some 
would say, obsession, over individual freedoms. 




who-decides.   
23 Id.  
24 See “Facts about the Death Penalty,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER (July 17, 2020) 
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/FactSheet.f1595
023050.pdf  
25 “Death Penalty: How many countries still have it?,” B.B.C NEWS 
(Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45835584. 
26 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 
U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).   
27 See generally U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 




States of America. The Constitution is laid out in a way 
that clearly demarks those rights and protects them from 
the State's over-intrusion that might threaten them. The 
First Amendment creates a right for Americans to exercise 
their religion freely. It guarantees the freedom to believe 
and freedom to act.28 It also creates protections to the 
citizens from the State prohibiting the Establishment of 
religion through any agent of the government.29 In order 
for the government to establish laws that are 
discriminatory on their face, upon a challenge, it has the 
burden of proving that the discrimination is justified 
under strict scrutiny.30 That is, there must be a compelling 
government interest that cannot be achieved through any 
other means.31  If the law is not discriminatory on its face, 
it can still violate the Establishment Clause.32 According to 
the Lemon Test, a government action is unconstitutional 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
unless it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does 
not foster excessive government entanglement with 
religion.33  
Under the Establishment Clause, the government 
cannot single out a particular religious sect for special 
treatment.34 There are three different approaches to avoid 
the Establishment of religion through governmental 
action: strict separation, neutrality, and accommodation.35 
 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).  
31 Id.  
32 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (Douglas, J. and Black, J., 
concurring) (1971).  
33 Id.  
34 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 509 U.S. 
938, [709-710] (1993).  
35 Separation of Church and State, THE BOISI CENTER PAPERS ON 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
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The strict separation approach is compared to a wall 
between church and state, and it was first proposed by 
Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, who believed 
religion was better served away from government control. 
The neutrality theory which is less widely applied and 
focuses on "not utilizing religion as a standard of action or 
inaction from a hypothetical, neutral observer point of 
view.36 The accommodation theory recognizes the 
importance of religion and tries to accommodate its 
presence in the government. This theory is the most 
widely used in modern jurisprudence, and the one that 
can be best applied to the Court’s decisions discussed 
herein.  
 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DEATH ROW INMATES 
The First Amendment of the Constitution protects 
the constituents of the United States against the 
Establishment of religion by governmental action and the 
prohibition of the free exercise thereof.37 The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act, which will be 
referred to as R.L.U.I.P.A., significantly enhanced 
prisoners’ right to religious exercise, above the minimum 
provided by the First Amendment.38 Under federal law, a 
prison or jail cannot substantially burden a prisoner’s 
exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that it has a 
compelling interest that cannot be achieved through any 
other less restrictive means.39 Congress defines "religious 
 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/bc_pa
pers/BCP-ChurchState.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
36 Id.  
37 See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.  
38 Lewis M. Wasserman, John P. Connolly, & Kent R. Kerley, Religious 
Liberty in Prisons under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act Following Holt v. Hobbs: An Empirical Analysis, RELIGIONS 
(July 7, 2018). 
39 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2000cc et seq.).  




exercise" capaciously to include any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.40 Under R.L.U.I.P.A., the challenging 
party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious 
exercise is grounded on sincerely held religious belief and 
that the government's action substantially burdens his 
religious exercise.41  
 
III. THE STORIES 
On November 6, 2018, the State of Alabama 
scheduled Dominique Ray's execution date for February 
7, 2019.42 He had been on death row since 1999 after he 
was tried for the rape and murder of 15-year-old-girl, 
Tiffany Harville.43 The inmate, through counsel, filed an 
emergency stay of execution, on January 28, 2019.44 Under 
the state's policy, a Christian prisoner may have a minister 
of his faith accompany him into the execution chamber to 
say his last rites, but not so for inmates of other faiths.45 
Mr. Ray was a devout Muslim and wished to have his 
Imam present at the execution chamber to pronounce his 
last rites.46    
According to the Alabama Department of 
Corrections (A.D.O.C.), a death-sentenced inmate is 
permitted to meet with their spiritual advisor until shortly 
before the inmate is taken to the chamber.47 However, only 
the prison Chaplin—a Christian, non-Catholic—is 
allowed to be present in the execution chamber during the 
 
40 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 856 (2015). 
4142 U.S.C 2000cc; See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
682 (2014). 
42 Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019). 
43 Ray v. State, 809 So. 2d 875 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). 
44 Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661. 
45 Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
46 Id. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
47 Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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execution.48 The plaintiff argued that this posed a 
violation of the Establishment Clause by preferencing the 
Christian religion over other religions. The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that there was a substantial likelihood 
that Mr. Ray would succeed on the merits of his claim.49 
Mr. Ray also argued that prohibiting the presence of his 
Imam at the execution chamber, substantially burdened 
his free exercise of religion.50 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court ruled in a 5-4 decision against Mr. Ray.51 He would 
be executed as scheduled, without his Imam present. He 
was pronounced dead at 10:12 p.m. His Imam was not 
allowed to be present. Mr. Ray’s last words at the 
execution chamber were an Islamic statement of his faith, 
in Arabic.52  
Patrick Henry Murphy was scheduled for 
execution on March 28, 2019, for the murder of police 
officer Aubrey Hawkins on December 24, 2000.53 While in 
prison, he became a Pure Land Buddhist.54 He converted 
nearly a decade ago and had been visited by a Buddhist 
priest, Rev. Hui-Yong Shih, for the past six years.55 In 
Texas, like Alabama, any of the prison system chaplains, 
but no other cleric may enter the execution chamber with 
 
48 Id.  
49 Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 551 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
50 Ray v. Dunn, 2:19-CV-88-WKW, 2019 WL 418105, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 
Feb. 1, 2019). 
51 Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019).  
52 Kim Chandler, Dominique Ray, Muslim Inmate, Executed After Appeal 
Over Spiritual Adviser Fails, HUFFPOST (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dominique-ray-muslim-inmate-
supreme-court-execution_n_5c5cf494e4b0a502ca3401a7. 
53 Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1478 (2019). 
54 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2000cc et seq.).  
55 Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1479. 




the prisoner.56 Texas has more than 100 chaplains who are 
either employees or under contract with the prison 
system, but none is a Buddhist priest.57 After failing to 
solve the matter through the Texas prison system and 
courts, the petitioner files for a stay of execution of the 
sentence of death.58 Murphy raised an equal treatment 
claim, under the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The Court 
granted a stay.60 Five days afterward, Texas changed its 
unconstitutional policy, effective immediately.61 Texas 
now allows all religious ministers only in the viewing 
room and not in the execution room.  
These two cases with practically identical issues 
were decided within a month of each other. While it might 
seem that the decisions were significantly different one 
from the other, in reality, neither of them addresses the 
issue; they do not provide the appropriate relief that best 
protects the prisoner's First Amendments rights. One 
decision portrays absolute disregard and inaction, while 
the other correctly identifies the matter, but the resolution 
far from solves the issue at hand. 
A. THE COURT IN DUNN V. RAY 
Through a very short and vague majority opinion, 
the Court in Dunn v. Ray did not act regarding his petition 
to have his Imam present at the execution chamber with 
him by simply saying that, it was a last-minute request.62 
"Because Ray waited until January 28, 2019, to seek relief, 
we grant the State's application to vacate the stay entered 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1475. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Circuit."63 The majority did not reach a decision regarding 
the matter. Instead, they did not address the issue under 
the blanket of lack of timeliness. While the Court has 
discretion on whether to review a capital case based on 
timeliness, to avoid “dilatory litigation tactics,”64 as Justice 
Kagan points out in her descent, this should not be an 
issue in this case. Ray brought this case in a timely 
manner. The warden denied Ray’s request to have his 
Imam by his side on January 23, 2019, and Ray filed his 
complaint five days later on January 28. Justice Kagan 
rightfully points out that “the relevant statue in Alabama 
would not have placed Ray on notice that the prison 
would deny his request,”65 as the statute provides that 
"both the chaplain of the prison and the inmate's spiritual 
adviser of choice may be present at the execution 
chamber."66  
The statue itself is vague. It makes no distinction 
between persons who may be present within the execution 
chamber and those who may enter only the viewing 
room.67 The statue does not distinguish between a prison’s 
employees or non-employees, which is the State’s 
reasoning for not allowing Mr. Ray’s Imam to be present 
at the execution chamber. The Alabama statute reads:  
(a) The following persons may be present at an 
execution and none other: 
. . .  
 (4) The spiritual advisor of the condemned. 




64 Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1478. 
65 Id.  
66 Ala. Code § 15-18-83(a) (2018). 
67 Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
68 Ala. Code § 15-18-8. 




Mr. Ray timely requested to the execution warden three 
accommodations based on his religious beliefs, all of 
which were denied.69 The first, that his spiritual advisor be 
present with him at the execution chamber.70 The second 
request, that the Christian Chaplain not be present during 
the execution.71 The third request, that no autopsy be 
performed on his body.72 The warden denied the first two 
requests, and said he had no power over the third 
request.73  
 The State said in the court filing that the execution 
could proceed without the Christian Chaplain in the room. 
However, it could not allow Mr. Ray’s spiritual advisor in 
its place, because he was not an employee of the prison.74 
The code does not reference where exactly a spiritual 
advisor other than the Chaplain would be allowed during 
the execution. It only mentions that the inmate's spiritual 
advisor, other than the Christian Chaplain, may be present 
during the execution.75  
In practice, a spiritual advisor is to be present as 
one of the inmates’ designated execution witnesses, in a 
small room behind a large, partially-opaque window to 
the inmate’s left, outside the execution chamber,76 not in 
place, or next to, the prison’s Christian Chaplain. Once in 
the execution chamber, a death-sentenced inmate who 
wishes to have physical contact with a religious leader 
 




72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 694. 
75 Ala. Code § 15-18-8. 
76 Complaint at 51, Burton v. Dunn, 2:19-cv-242-ECM, 2019 WL 
6173502 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2019). 
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while making a final prayer may only do so with the 
prison chaplain.77  
 The prison's justification for this accommodation, 
or lack thereof, is that the Christian Chaplin is an 
employee of the prison.  A private spiritual advisor may 
accompany the inmate to the holding cell to await the final 
walk to the chamber.78 However, the State does not let the 
private spiritual advisor accompany the inmate into the 
execution chamber itself.79 A state-employed chaplain is a 
member of the execution team and is usually in the death 
chamber during executions.80 The current Chaplain is a 
Christian.81 The state has never allowed an inmate's 
private spiritual advisor to be inside the chamber during 
an execution, regardless of the private spiritual advisor's 
religious affiliation.82  
 The State argued that this policy is justified under 
R.L.U.I.P.A. because it has a compelling interest and, 
based on the record, it appears that there are no less-
restrictive means of furthering the State's interests.83 These 
interests are the “moral obligation to carry out executions 
with the degree of seriousness and respect that the state-
administered termination of human life demands.”84 The 
state Chaplin is a trained member of the execution team, 
who has witnessed dozens of executions, is trained on 
how to respond if something goes wrong, and if he 
disobeys orders, he would face disciplinary actions.85  
 
77 Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105, at *2. 
78 See Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105, at *2. 
79 Id.  
80 Id 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at *4-*5. 
84 Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 230 (3d Cir. 2010); Ray v. Dunn, 
2019 WL 418105 at *5. 
85 Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105 at *6. 




Understandably, a prisoner's execution is a solemn 
moment that must be performed with the utmost 
seriousness and respect. Precisely because of the 
solemnity and seriousness of death itself is why the 
decision of the Court in this case is, as Justice Kagan lays 
out in her dissent, "profoundly wrong."86 Her dissent 
expresses the frustration about the fact that the Court 
simply ignored the issue at hand. She addresses that 
while the circuit court thought that there was a 
substantial likelihood that the prison’s policy violated 
Mr. Ray’s First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court 
did not even address this issue, and instead denied relief 
on the grounds of timeliness.87  
The Supreme Court agreed with the Alabama court 
that the prisoner delayed bringing the action.88 Justice 
Roberts, delivering the majority opinion of the Court, 
granted the State's application to vacate the stay by the 
Eleventh Circuit because he waited until January 28, 2019, 
to seek relief.89 The Alabama District Court used the same 
reasoning in denying the motion for stay. The Court 
references that, because he had been on death row for 
more than nineteen years, he "reasonably should have 
learned that the State allows only members of the 
execution team, which previously has included a state-
employed chaplain, inside the execution chamber.”90  
The Court’s opinion about this matter shows, if 
anything, the disconnection that exists between them and 
the realities of inmates like Mr. Ray. While they correctly 
point out, that he has had legal representation since at 
least 2003,91 this fact does not make his claim less valid or 
urgent. The circumstances of legal representation for 
 
86 Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 662. 
88 Id. at 661. 
89 Id. at 661. 
90 Ray v. Dunn, 2:19-CV-88-WKW,2019 WL at *4. 
91 Id. at *4. 
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prisoners like Mr. Ray are generally, at best, adequate, 
both during trial and appeal procedures. Inadequate 
representation is the main reason why death penalty cases 
are reversed.92 In 2003, the American Bar Association 
(ABA), published its revised Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.93 
These include requiring the attorneys to have abilities, 
expertise, and skills in representing clients in capital cases; 
providing two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation 
specialist in every case, as well as full funding for the 
defense.94 According to the ABA, no state has yet 
established standards that meet these minimum 
requirements.95 Studies conducted in Tennessee revealed 
that in one-fourth of capital cases, attorneys offer no 
mitigation at trial.96 In Philadelphia, 60 percent of all 
capital cases went without proper investigation or an 
experienced attorney.97 In Louisiana, death penalty 
inmates have faced a waitlist for an attorney since 2017, 
due to state budget cuts that led the public defenders’ 
offices to a depletion of money.98 In Alabama, where Mr. 
Ray was tried and executed, it is no different. One study 
of four Alabama counties suing contract attorneys 
revealed that in 72.5 percent of felony cases the attorney 
did not file a single motion, and in 99.4 percent of cases the 
attorney did not request the funds for experts or 
 
92 Inadequate Representation, A.C.L.U., 
https://www.aclu.org/other/inadequate-representation (last 
visited August 10, 2020). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Eli Hager, Where the Poor Face the Death Penalty Without a Lawyer, 
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/28/where-the-poor-
face-the-death-penalty-without-a-lawyer.  




investigators.99 Unlike every other state with the death 
penalty, Alabama does not provide legal assistance to 
condemned inmates for preparing and filing 
postconviction claims.100  
This crisis is worrisome and the issue one of life or 
death. Adequate and timely representation for death row 
inmates is a luxury. While one cannot correctly point out 
that these were Mr. Ray's particular circumstances, it is 
unlikely that he received above-average representation 
during the entire process, which would substantially 
affect the timeliness with which the issues were brought.  
Focused on the timeliness, or apparent lack thereof, the 
Court ignored the bigger problem. Like Judge W. Keith 
Watkins correctly pointed out in the Alabama District 
Court Opinion, this case was not about whether the 
execution would take place, but about when and who will 
be allowed inside the execution chamber.101 This case was 
about a condemned man’s right to have an execution no 
less "solemn," as the state points out in their response, than 
any other inmate before him. He was claiming the rights 
that he would have had, had he been Christian instead of 
Muslim. The right to say a final prayer and the right to 
hold the hand of your spiritual advisor as you die; these 
are not extraordinary or burdensome requests. At least, it 
had not been before, not when it came from Cristian 
inmates. For them, a Chaplain was readily available and 
authorized to remain with them inside the execution 
chamber and during their passing. However, for any other 
inmate, one like Mr. Ray, who practiced a different, and 
widely condemned religion in America, it becomes no 
longer a right, but an accommodation. According to the 
Court’s decisions in these cases, the solemnity of an 
inmate’s death is not a compelling interest for the state; 
 
99 The Crisis of Counsel in Alabama, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Nov. 12, 
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therefore, the Court may not grant inmates from minority 
religions equal protections of the law. Mr. Ray's freedom 
of worship right was killed by the Court before he ever 
was. So was his integrity as a person and believer of the 
Muslim faith.   
 
B. THE CASE FOR AMENDS THAT DID NOT CREATE ANY    
 
Murphy v. Collier was decided about two months 
after Ray.  Justice Kavanaugh delivers a concurring 
opinion that attempts to highlight distinctions between 
this case and Ray, and why the Court ruled differently in 
this instance.102  The first point Justice Kavanaugh makes 
is that Murphy, unlike Ray, made a distinction for equal 
protection, and not Establishment. Second, he points out 
that if there would have been an equal treatment issue 
pointed out, then it would have been resolved, as it was in 
this case.  Third, he says that Murphy, unlike Ray, raised 
the issue in a timely manner. 
Texas and Alabama share a similar policy when it 
comes to who can be present in the chamber with the 
prisoner at the time of execution.103 Mr. Murphy, through 
counsel, made several requests to the Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice (T.D.C.J.) General Counsel, Collier, 
regarding the desire to have his T.D.C.J. approved 
spiritual advisor, a Buddhist priest that had visited him 
for the past six years, instead of the T.D.C.J. Christian 
chaplain who is ordinarily present during the 
executions.104 He said that this was necessary to “focus on 
the buddha at the time of death . . . .”105 He also requested 
for his body not to be moved for seven minutes after the 
 
102 Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1111 (2019). 
103 Murphy v. Collier, 376 F. Supp. 3d 734, 736 (S.D. Tex. 
2019), aff'd, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019). 
104 Murphy, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 736. 
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execution.106 Five days after submitting his request, he 
received a response from T.D.C. General Counsel.107 They 
would honor his request of not moving his body for seven 
minutes after the execution.108 The Christian Chaplain 
would not be present during the execution.109 However, 
he was denied the presence of his spiritual advisor in the 
execution chamber because he was not an employee of the 
prison.110 The counselor of Mr. Murphy then said that he 
would be satisfied with any Buddhist chaplain.111 There 
was no Buddhist priest employed or contracted by the 
Texas prison system, among the over 100 chaplains 
employed.112 Mr. Murphy had been a devout Buddhist for 
over a decade, and on March 20, 2019, he filed a petition 
for Writ of Prohibition in the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals raising two issues: violation of the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise of religion.113   
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Justice Kavanaugh makes a distinction between 
the cases based on the claims that were brought to the 
Court114:  
 
First, unlike Murphy, Ray did not raise an 
equal treatment claim. Ray raised an 
Establishment Clause claim to have the 
State's Christian chaplain removed from the 
execution room. The State of Alabama then 
agreed to remove the Christian Chaplin, 
thereby mooting the claim. Ray also raised a 
R.L.U.I.P.A. claim to have his Muslim 
religious minister in the execution room and 
not just in the viewing room.115 
 
Both Alabama and Texas policies violate the 
Establishment Clause by "preferring one official religious 
denomination over another."116 The Texas statute is, on its 
face, discriminatory because it only allows for inmates of 
two religions, Christians and Muslims, to have their 
spiritual advisor present during their execution.117 The 
Alabama statute is not on its face discriminatory, as it does 
not make a statutory distinction among inmates’ religions. 
However, in its application, it does, because the prison 
only employs a Christian chaplain.  
Justice Kavanaugh then says that the Establishment 
Clause issue was resolved in Murphy because, effective 
immediately, Texas changed its unconstitutional policy, 
and did so immediately.118 Texas now allows all religious 
ministers only in the viewing room.119 He says that the 
Establishment claim in Ray became moot the moment that 
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Alabama agreed to remove the Chaplain from the 
execution chamber per the prisoner's request; therefore, 
the Court had no reason to review his claims.120 The idea 
that the Equal Treatment issue was properly resolved in 
Murphy shows a profound disconnect from the Court to 
the heart of the issue at hand. As Justice Kagan remarks in 
her descent in Ray, “[t]he clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause, this Court has held, is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”121 While Ray could have successfully raised an 
Equal Protection claim, there is no doubt that the 
Establishment Clause issue was equally present. Had the 
Establishment Clause issue been appropriately solved, it 
would have also solved the Equal Protection violation, as 
it came as a direct consequence of the Establishment clause 
violation. The reason that Mr. Ray and Mr. Murphy raised 
these claims was not to reduce the rights of other prisoners 
but to equalize their own to the level of where others had 
been before. Prisoners before have had their legitimate 
right of holding the hand of their spiritual advisor before 
being executed. Having their spiritual advisor present at 
the execution chamber is just a right of dignity that should 
not be abridged to everyone but instead extended to those 
who could not have it because of discriminating policies. 
The Equal Protection of the law should move toward 
extending rights and not diminishing them. The Equal 
Protection clause was not established to go backward but 
forward. It was not established to take away rights in the 
name of equality but to grant them. 
This moves us toward the next point in Justice 
Kavanaugh’s opinion. He referenced that “the State has a 
compelling interest in controlling access to the execution 
room, which means that an inmate likely cannot prevail 
on a R.L.U.I.P.A. or free exercise claim to have a religious 
minister in the execution room and not just the viewing 
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room."122 In American constitutional law, governmental 
actions that infringe fundamental rights must survive 
strict judicial scrutiny.123 That is, reviewing courts will 
require the government to prove that the infringing action 
serves a compelling governmental interest by narrowly 
tailored means.124 
Holt v. Hobbs125 lays the foundation for the Court's 
most recent interpretation of R.L.U.I.P.A. as it applies to 
confined inmates. The Court ruled in favor of a prisoner 
who requested to be able to grow a short beard, as part of 
his practice of the Muslim faith.126 The Arkansas 
Department of Correction prohibits its prisoners from 
growing beards, with the exception of ¼ inch beards for 
inmates with skin conditions, for security purposes. While 
he believed that he should not trim his beard at all, 
according to his religious practice, he agreed to 
compromise to grow a ½ inch beard.127 Prison officials 
denied his request, at the reasoning that “the beards 
compromised prison safety because they could be used to 
hide contraband and because an inmate could quickly 
shave his beard to disguise his identity.”128 The 
petitioner’s claim was dismissed by the District Court and 
Eighth Circuit.129 The Court found that the prohibition to 
the inmate constituted a violation of his First Amendment 
rights under R.L.U.I.P.A.130  
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 Holt exemplifies the proper accommodations that 
should be made for prisoners under R.L.U.I.P.A. Justice 
Kavanaugh does not consider any possible alternatives or 
accommodations to the R.L.U.I.P.A. claim. While a 
consensus can be made that an execution is a solemn and 
serious matter and that there is a compelling government 
interest to safeguard the safety of the prisoner, as well as 
the integrity of the process, other possible solutions exist. 
The main issue that can be spotted in both cases is that the 
statutes are vague, and that leaves room for 
discriminatory practices. 
  Justice Alito rightfully points out in his dissent, 
“the record in this case is very inadequate to show the 
reason for the omission of chaplains of other religions.”131 
It does not show what is needed to serve as a chaplain, the 
vetting of potential chaplains, general training that 
chaplains receive, any special orientation provided to a 
chaplain who accompanies a prisoner during the process 
of execution or whether there are specific restrictions on 
movements or sounds that might interfere with the work 
of any of those carrying out the execution.132 These 
omissions are critical because they make it harder to 
determine what exactly would be a possible solution to 
allow a prisoner's spiritual advisor to be present in the 
execution chamber. What is clear is that accommodations 
could be possible without risking the State's interest in the 
prisoner's security and the integrity of the execution 
process. 
  Justice Alito raises the concern that it "is not enough 
for a prisoner to assert a claim that would succeed in the 
outside world."133 Instead, four factors must be 
considered, according to Overton v. Bazzetta134: (1) whether 
a prison rule bears a "valid rational connection with a 
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legitimate government interest";  (2) "whether alternative 
means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right"; 
(3) "what impact an accommodation of the right would 
have on guards, inmates and prison resources"; (4) 
"whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation." 
We have established through this analysis that, there is a 
legitimate government interest. The next steps would be 
to explore alternative means to the existing policies, their 
impact, and ready alternatives to the existing regulations. 
The approach should be a state-by-state approach 
that analyzes individual policies and how they need to 
change to accommodate inmates of minority religions 
adequately. The prisons' policies need to be clear about 
who is allowed in the death chamber at the moment of the 
execution, as well as requirements to become an 
authorized chaplain. Generally, surveys can be conducted 
in prisons to help establish a need for chaplains of 
different religions who are not currently employed by the 
prison. Not all spiritual advisors need to be employed by 
the prison. They can be independent contractors who 
receive the execution training and are available at request, 
as needed. A protocol can be established, clarifying the 
precise steps to be taken by each prisoner to have their 
request for a specific spiritual advisor available at the time 
of their execution. Executions are lengthy, intricate 
processes that take years, even decades. It is hard to 
believe that with such a timeline, it would be burdensome 
to create such accommodations for prisoners. 
The final distinction Justice Kavanaugh makes in 
his concurrence is that the issue in Murphy was raised in a 
timely manner.135 The timeline in Murphy is similar to the 
one in Ray. However, in Murphy, the majority said that the 
claim was raised in a timely manner. Justice Alito descents 
on this specific matter, pointing out that the timeline in 
Murphy, if anything, is more dilatory than the timeline in 
Ray. In Murphy, the Federal District Court suit was filed 
two days before the execution date. Justice Alito raises the 
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concern that "while these claims are important and may 
ultimately be held to have merit . . . they are not simple 
and require careful consideration of the interests of both 
prisoners and prison."136 He details how the late filing in 
Murphy should constitute a dilatory litigation tactic 
because the attorney should have been aware of the 
execution protocol in Texas, as it has been in place on the 
public record since 2012. The alleged R.L.U.I.P.A. 
violation then could have been challenged in a timelier 
manner as opposed to two days before the execution. In 
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Ray, she rightfully points out 
that in this case, “the relevant statue would not have 
placed Ray on notice that the warden may deny his 
request.”137 The timeline issue then bounces back to the 
vagueness of the statutes, the lack of consistency in 
policies, and the availability of counselors to raise the 
claims with anticipation. The bottom line is that one case 
unfairly denied review based on grounds consistent with 
one who was reviewed by the Court.   The Court chose to 
focus on possible technicalities to avoid addressing the 
issue of the First Amendment violations that existed.  
 
I. CONCLUSION 
Both Texas and Alabama statues violate the 
Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and 
the Free Exercise Clause. While there is a legitimate, 
compelling interest in the safety and integrity of the 
execution procedure, accommodations can also be done to 
ensure that each prisoner’s First Amendment rights are 
intact through the process. It should be a state-by-state 
approach that analyzes existing policies, identifies current 
existing statutory and practice violations to the inmates’ 
First Amendment rights within the context of execution, 
and creates a detailed protocol that allows for timely, 
reasonable accommodations as needed.  
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The State should not abridge the right of an 
individual to a dignified death. Dedicated to those whose 
freedom of worship right was killed before they ever were. 
May we do better next time. Let us remember that, the true 
measure of our character is how we treat the poor, the 
disfavored, the accused, the incarcerated, and the 
condemned.138 
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